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UNITED STATES Federal/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY. Petr challenges CA s•s rule that police armed 
with a warrant for an individual's arrest need not obtain a 
search warrant to enter the house of a third party to execute 
the arrest warrant. 
2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW. In January 1978 a 
confidential informant who previously had supplied police with 
information that proved reliable informed Agent Rassey of the 
~ J~. (k_ ~.~.· ~LPiJ) j!L;, /YI~ k, 
~Q ~ ~ t;s ~ ~ f.r ~ R4~ 11''~ ,;~~. 
J~ '-<1 /U-0 ; /r' ~ ~no/~ ~ 
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DEA in Detroit that he might be able to loc?te Ricky Lyons, 
wanted by the DEA, and another individual named Jimmy, wanted 
on Georgia drug charges. The informant contacted Rassey 
subsequently and told him that Lyons and Jimmy were in 
Atlanta. The informant gave Rassey a telephone number that 
Jimmy had said would be good for twenty-four ~ours and said he 
had heard Lyons' voice on the other end of the line. Rassey 
passed this information on to Agent Goodowens of the DEA office 
in Savannah, Georgia. Goodowens knew that a Ricky Lyons had 
been indicted on federal drug charges in the SD of Ga and, 
after further checking, discovered that a warrant had been 
issued for Lyons' arrest. 
Goodowens contacted the telephone company and learned the 
address of the number Jimmy had supplied. In the meantime, 
Rassey received a series of calls from the informant, who told 
Rassey each time that Jimmy had called again and still said he 
and Lyons were at the same number. Rassey passed this 
information on to Goodowens in a series of conversations. 
On the afternoon of January 18, Goodowens led a force of 
several DEA agents and local police officers to the address 
they had obtained from the telephone company. The agents saw 
two men in the front yard, later identified as petr and 
codefendant Hoyt A. Gaultney. When Goodowens determined that 
neither was Lyons, he sent another agent to the house. Mrs. 
Gaultney answered. In response to the agent's questioning, she 
stated there was no one rramed Ricky Lyons inside. The agent 
then entered the house without Mrs. Gaultney 's consent to look 





bedroom. He entered and found balance sc~les, a clear plastic 
bag containing white powder, and other apparent drug 
paraphernalia. One of the agents then drove to Atlanta to 
obtain a warrant to search the entire house. When he obtained 
it, he phoned the agents who had stayed behind, and they 
conducted an extensive search. They found sqme forty-three 
pounds of pure cocaine and a variety of narcotics-processing 
paraphernalia. 
On the basis of this evidence, petr was indicted and 
convicted of one substantive and one conspiracy count relating 
to possession of cocaine with intent to sell. (Gaultney also 
was convicted; Mrs. Gaultney and "Jimmy" received directed 
acquittals.) Petr received five years to run concurrently on 
each count, to be followed by a special parole term of three 
Petr appealed to CA 5, arguing, inter alia, that the yeas. 
l search 
} fourth 
of the house in an attempt to locate Lyons violated the 
amendment. 
The CA upheld the introduction of the evidence seized. It 
reiterated the CA 5 rule, first enunciated in United States v. 
Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 
(1976), that police armed with an arrest warrant need not 
obtain a search warrant to enter the house of a third party if ---. 
they reasonably believe the person to be arrested is within. 
It also held that the information given to Rassey and passed on 
to Goodowens was sufficient to meet that standards of ~uilar 
and Spinelli. Judge Kravitch dissented, doubting that the 
evidence connecting linking Lyons to the premises was 




subsequently amended its opinion to elaborate on the reasons 
why Aguilar and Spinelli were met; Judge Kravitch added a brief 
dissent questioning the validity of the Cravero rule. The full 
CA denied rehearing en bane. 
3. CONTENTIONS. Petr argues, first, that the Cravero rule 
is incorrect. He believes that police shou+d be required to 
reappear before a magistrate before they invade the privacy of 
a third person. He contends that this decision conflicts with 
CA 3's decision in Government of Virgin Islands ~ Gereau, 502 
F.2d 914, 928 ·(3d Cir. 1974), which held that police may 
execute arrest warrants on the premises of thir? parties 
without the authorization of a magistrate only if there are 
exigent circumstances. Petr thus believes that the initial 
entry into the house was unlawful; the drugs and paraphernalia 
subsequently discovered, including those found pursuant to the 
search warrant, are fruits of the poisonous tree. 
Second, petr believes the information supplied by the 
informant was inadequate to support a wa r rant under Aguilar and 
Spinelli. He contends that the informant did not provide 
Rassey with the circumstances underlying his assertion that 
Lyons was in the house and that Jimmy was to be believed. 
4. ANALYSIS. The first issue petr raises is ·fairly 
significant and presents a confl i ct be tween CA 3 and CA 5. 
Although this Court's decision last term in P ayton~ New York, 
Nos. 79-5420 & 79-5421 (Apr. 15, 1980), sugges ts that an arrest 
warrant may suffice to authorize entry into the suspect's own 
house when pol i ce believ e he i s inside , i t saL d noth i ng about 
whether police may ente r the residence of a t h ird person. Th is 
ques t ion left open is important . 
- 5 -
Despite the importance of the issue, this may not be the 
proper case for resolving it. Petr nowhe~e in his petn asserts 
that he owned, resided in, or regularly used the house 
searched; t•e petn and the CA 5 opinion indicate only that he 
was standing in the driveway talking with Gaultney~when the 
police arrived. Under the circumstances, then, it is likely 
that petr would not be able to demonstrate a ~egitimate 
expectation of privacy in the premises searched sufficient to 
prove a violation of his, as opposed to the Gaultneys', fourth 
amendment rights. Calling for a response might clarify this 
factual question, but it may be better to wait for a clear case. 
The second issue--whether the informant's tip satisfied 
Aguilar and Spinelli--is f~ct specific and not certworthy. 
There is no response. 
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UNITED STATES Federal/Criminal Timely 
Since I prepared the preliminary memorandum in this case, 
the~G has filed a response. First, his factual discussion 
resolves the question of w~ether petr had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the house searched: the SG states 
that the house was "occupied by p~titioner .. " Brief in 
. / -___:· . 
Opp at 3. Thus, petr could challenge the lawfulness of the 
~
officers' conduct. 
The SG admiis that the issue is significant and that the 
~ 
circuits are split~ 
~---·-
He nevertheless believes that because the 
~~~~~~--~ 
officers complied with Cravero, the prevailing CA 5 rule at the 
time they entered the house, no deterrent purpose would be 
served by excluding this evidence: he cites Michigan ~ 
DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), Bowen ~ United States, 422 U.S. 




for this proposition. Thus, the SG argues, it would not be 
wise to take this case. He also notes that the lower courts 
should have the opportunity to reassess CA S's rule in light of 
the language at the end of Payton. 
v 
I now believe this Court should grant cert. This issue is 
one of great practical significance and the circuits are split, 
as the SG has conceded. Any hesitation due to the lack of a 
description of petr's interest in the . house now has been 
dispelled. The SG's attempt to avoid cert based on the 
retroactivity cases is disingenuous. DeFillipo involved a 
conviction based on evidence seized after a stop authorized by 
an unconstitutional statute. In Bowen and Peltier, the Court 
refused to apply a previously decided rule to police conduct 
occuring before the rule was announced. This case, on the 
contrary, would be the seminal case on ·this issue, not one 
subsequently winding its way through the judicial system. Even 
when retroactivity would be inappropriate, this Court 
traditionally allows the petr initially seeking review to • 
pursue his claim; otherwise, no one would have the incentiv e to 
litigate the underlying constitutional question. If cert is 
{ not granted, I am not sure how the SG believes this issue ever 
j can reach this Court for definitive resolution. If the ·court 
grants cert, and if it determines that Cravero is incorrect, it 
can decide in a later case whether this new r u le should be 
applied prospectively only. I see little to be gained by 
waiting for lower courts to reconsider this issue in light of 
the short phrase in Payton. 
There is now a response. 
9/9/80 Ale Opinion in petn 
September 29, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on ..... ............ , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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r-_~ Question Presented~~ ;f~ ~ M•A-..(. 
It>~~ ~~--WkMh/' . 4- ~-~-IA-/,.V~ 
Whether it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment 
er,r-~~. !lf-~~~~~
for the police to enter a home for the purpose of arresting a 
person ~' resi here, armed with an arrest warrant 
but no search warrant. 
Background 




was arrested at a cabin in Buford, Georgia by DEA agents. 
These agents had received information from a reliable 
informant that two fug it i ves--Ricky Lyons and "J immy"--would 
be at at certain phone number for 24 hours. Two days later, 
the informant called with information that the two men were 
still at the same location. The agents traced the phone 
number to the Buford cabin during the following two days, and 
received confirmations from the informant that their targets 
remained at the same phone number. They then proceeded to the 
·W~ 
cabin to attempt to arrest Lyons, for whom there was an ~ 
outstanding DEA arrest warrant. ~ 
When the agents arrived at the cabin, they noticed ~ 
two men squatting by a car in the driveway--petr and Hoyt k./i-. 
------------- ____..... --· __.. .i?A-~ 
Gaultney. One of the agents thought Gaultney was Lyons, but 
soon realized his error. Both men produced identification, 
and one agent proceeded to the front door, where he 
encountered Kathy Gaultney. She said that Lyons was not 5~ 
there, but the agent proceeded to search the cabin for him. ~ .,.. 
He came across paraphernalia and white powder in one ...__ ______________ .._____..._ _________ --------------
room. He then drove to Atlanta to obtain a search warrant, -
while another agent proceeded to look through an open suitcase 
containing more white powder. Petr and the Gaultney's were 
arrested. Gaultney asked to speak privately with an agent, 
and the agents prepared for this conversation by searching the 
whole room for weapons (including a closed sui tease in the 
closet, where they discovered more incriminating evidence) • 
; . 3. 
Gaultney ultimately directed the officers to yet another 
suitcase containing cocaine. Later, James Smith, to whom the 
cabin was leased, came home and was arrested. Finally, a 
thorough search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant. 
Petr moved to suppress all the evidence in the case, 
'------------
arguing that the initial entry in search of Lyons was illegal 
a~ed to all subsequent events. The district court 
-suppressed a few specific items of evidence but held that the 
initial entry itself was legal because the agents had an 
arrest warrant for Lyons. There remained sufficient 
unsuppressed evidence to convict petr and his codefendants. 
The CAS affirmed, citing United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 
406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977) (entry 
permitted where officers have arrest warrant for third party 
and reasonable belief that he is on the premises). Judge 
Kravitch dissented on the ground that the agents did not have 
a "reasonable belief" that Lyons was in the cabin. 7 
Discussion 
left 
This case was granted in order to decide a question ~~ 
open after Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) ~ 
, 
(arrest warrant required for arrest in suspect's own home)-- ~ ---whether an arrest warrant is sufficient to justify an entry P~~ 
into a third party's home, or whether a search warrant is 
required for such an arrest entry. There are, however, two ~~ 
preliminary issues that may prevent the Court from reac~ ~ · 
4. 
this important question. 
I. Petr's Expectation of Privacy in the Cabin 
The SG beg ins by arguing quite correctly that if 5&--
petr did not live in the cabin himself, he probably had no ~ 
&-k;~ 
expectation of privacy there and cannot raise this Fourth ~ ~ 
Amendment claim. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128 (1978). ~ ~ -------- ~ This case was decided below on the apparent assumption that ~ 
petr had "automatic standing" to raise this claim, before t~~~ 
concept was rejected in United States v. Salvucci, No. 79-244 ffr{ ~ 
(June 25, 1980). As a result, the record is ambiguous on the~~~ 
connection between petr and the cabin. The cabin was lease~ 
4?-:.~~ 
to another of the conspirators--Jim Smith--and petr was not 
even arrested while inside. A few of his possessions were 
. C/fs-
found inside, but nothing indicating that he was a full-time~~~~~;./ 
~~.--~-r~ resident of the cabin, even on a short-term basis. 
It is worth noting that this problem with th
is a direct result of the SG's own statements in his Brief in 
Opposition to the Petition. In the original pool memo, the -
author recommended against a grant on the ground that the 
record did not show that petr had an expectation of privacy in 
the cabin. Then, in its brief, the SG's office described the 
cabin as "petitioner's residence," and stated that it was 
occupied by petr and the Gaul tneys. The SG brief on the 
merits now describes those statements as erroneous, explaining ~~ 
that a "closer review of the record in connection with the 
preparation of this brief has revealed that those statements 
5. 
were mistaken." Br. at 17 n.8. 
In his reply brief, petr argues that the government 
ll . ~" 
has waived the stand1ng argument by failing to raise it below 
and by conceding in its brief in opposition that petr lived in 
the cabin. Responding to the argument that the government had 
no reason to raise this issue prior to Salvucci, he points out 
that a challenge to the automatic standing rule was raised in 
Salvucci itself, and could have been made here. 
I have my doubts about whether the government can be 
said to have waived this argument or conceded forever that 
petr lived in the cabin. On the other hand, it seems unfair 
simply to DIG the case, after having agreed that petr had 
-·-··--------------
presented a certworthy quest ion on the merits of his Fourth 
Amendment claim. Petr might well have been able to offer 
-- --·· .. ______..-
evidence at the suppress ion hearing showing that he had been 
staying in the cabin. Thus, unless the Court is willing to 
assume this factual issue against the Government, or to decide 
that Salvucci does not apply "retroactively" in this 
situation, I would recommend some sort of remand for factual 
development. 
•' 
II. The Retroactivity Que.§_t_!_on 
The SG also argues that the issue raised here should 
not be decided in a case such as this one involving a search 
that preceded Payton. The argument is that petr is suggesting 
~
an application of the ~~yton rule to his case and that he 
cannot do so because Payton should not be given retroactive 
6. 
application. See Bowen v. United States, 422 u.s. 916 (1975); 
Michigan v. Payne, 412 u.s. 47 (1973). I believe this 
argument is fallacious. 
The SG is probably correct that the Payton rule--
barring warrantless entries into a suspect's home to arrest 
him--should not apply retroactively to entries of that kind, 
at least in jurisdictions that had previously authorized such 
entries. In exclusionary rule cases, the Court has held that 
--there is no deterrent purpose served by excluding evidence on 
--------------~~----------~----------------------------
the basis of a new constitutional rule created after the 
search in quest ion. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 
(1975). 
You, however, have adopted a different 
that of Justice Harlan in United States v. Mackey, 401 U.S. 
~~L. :-;;-:/ . . 
667, 675 (1971) (new rules apply to all cases still on direct r~~ ________., 
review). See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 u.s. 233, 246 
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). This rule 
appears to apply even in exclusionary rule cases. Justice 
Harlan's Mackey opinion applied as well to Williams v. United 
States, 401 u.s. 646 (1971), a Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule case. And in Hankerson you referred to the fact that the 
police often rely in good faith on the existing state of the 
law, 432 U.S. at 247, thus suggesting that you would apply the 
Mackey rule to this kind of case. If Hank~J;_son does apply, J 
then there can be no retroactivity argument with respect to 
Payton in this case. 
7. 
In any event, even applying Peltier, I believe that 
the SG is wrong in suggesting that this is a case where the 
issue of the retoactivity of Payton is at issue. Although the 
thrust of the Payton opinion offers some support for the view 
that third parties should be protected in their homes from 
entries based solely on arrest warrants naming their guests, 
9~ 
the issue in this case is essentially separate from the issue~
i~ Payto~it(; lf. As the SG concedes, petr 's claim does not~ 
depend at all on the Payton holding and there were several '?~~ 
circuits that required a search warrant in this kind of ~ · 
situation long before Payton was decided. It therefore seems 
appropriate to treat this as a case involving a new point of ~ 
law, and to grant petr the benefit of the Court's new holding
.:::2-~ 
if he prevails on the merits. He is "the lucky individual~
whose case was chosen as the occasion for announcing the new -~ 
principle." Hankerson, supra, at 247. In sum, I would apply ~4._4 
the exclusionary rule to this case if the Court reaches the 
merits and rules for petr. 
III. The Merits 
The SG concedes the logic of petr 's basic position 
on the merits. Petr's argument is that a person residing in a ~ 
home should be protected from searches of his home for ~ 
&_~ 
suspects just as he is protected from searches of his home f 4 ~,~5,, 
things. The basic protection in this area is ~the ~ 
f--~ 
determination by a neutral magistrate that there is pro a le 
cause to believe that the "thing" sought is on the premise~ 
8. 
be searched. The fact that an arrest warrant for the person 
sought has been issued provides none of this protection to the 
resident of the home being entered, even if police are 
required to determine in advance that they have reasonable 
cause to believe that the suspect is on the premises. 
In Payton, the Court stated that 
In terms that apply equally to seizures of property 
and to seizures of person, the Fourth Amendment has 
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. 
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not 
reasonably be crossed without a warrant. 
445 u.s. at 590. The Court went on to hold, however, that an 
arrest warrant alone is sufficient to justify an entry into 
the suspect's own home, explaining: 
It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may 
afford less protection than a search warrant 
requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause between 
the zealous officer and the ·citizen. If there is 
sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in 
a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his 
arrest is justified, it is constitutionally 
reasonable to require him to open his doors to the 
officers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable 
cause implicitly carries with it the limited 
authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect 
lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is 
within. 




Thus, the Court adopted an accommodation that~ 
allowed entries based solely on arrest warrants because it fp ~ 
seemed reasonable to allow such an intrusion on someone's home 
~. 
dJ 






of a crime. As petr points out, the Court would be going much 
.,_l 
further if it were to hold that innocent third parties may 
...... ~ --- ,__..-
have their homes ~ ~earched \ ~henever the police think they have 
reason to believe that a fugitive (against whom an arrest 
warrant has issued) is within. --Faced with the logic of petr's position, the SG 
takes refuge in history and practical considerations. He - --~~------------------------------------------
argues that at common law an officer armed with an arrest 
warrant for someone could enter any premises to arrest him. 
In addition, he asserts that persons differ significantly from 
things in terms of their mobility, making a search warrant 
requirement unworkable. 
In my judgment, these arguments are an insufficient 
response to petr 's basic point that an arrest warrant for 
someone else offers him no protection of any kind and, if 
sufficient to justify an entry without a search warrant, 
amounts to a "general warrant" because it allows the police to 
make entries anywhere without the further intervention of a 
neutral magistrate. The practical problems appear to be 
overblown. First, it is not clear that persons are in fact 
more mobile than things. Objects can be carried from place to 
place and are much easier to conceal than persons. In a case 
like the present one, the officers would not have faced 
insuperable difficulties if they had been required to obtain a 
search warrant. They had information that Lyons was in the 
cabin for several days and, assuming that this information was 
-
10. 
sufficiently reliable to justify any entry, they could have 
used it to obtain a search warrant. Even in a hypothetical 
case in which the police learned of a suspect's presence in a 
home and felt a need to apprehend him immediately, they could 
set up a surveillance outside during the period of time that 
it took to obtain a search warrant. If, in the meantime, the 
suspect attempted to leave, he could be arrested immediately 
in a public place. Presumably Payton contemplated a similar 
approach in the event officers are seeking a suspect they know 
is at home but have not yet obtained an arrest warrant. 
Perhaps the best argument in favor of the 
practicality of a search warrant requirement in this kind of 
case is the fact that such a rule has prevailed in several 
circuits for some time. See Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Gereau, 502 F. 2d 9,14, 928 @ Cir. 1974) , cert. denied, 420 
u.s. 909 (1975): Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157 @] Cir. 
1980), cert. pending, No. 80-503: United States v. Prescott, 
581 F.2d 1343 6 Cir. 1978). To be sure, the majority of 
circuits have adopted the opposite rule, see cases cited in 
the SG's brief at 34 n.l9, but it is apparently not impossible 
to live with a search warrant requirement in this kind of 
case. 
On the other hand, a rule along the lines suggested 
by petr would create a different kind of practical problem--
identifying those who "reside" at a particular location. 
Under Payton, an arrest warrant is sufficient to justify an 
11. 
entry into the suspect's own home, but petr would establish a 
different rule for the homes of others. Especially when the 
person being sought is a fugitive, it may be difficult in many 
cases for the police to determine whether he has the status of 
a _ resident in a particular home, or is merely a visitor . ... 
Indeed, this issue may present intractable line-drawing 
problems.l Here, for example, the cabin was leased by one 
coconspirator, and the police knew that their suspect--Lyons--
had been staying there for several days. Did this make him a 
resident or a visitor? 
This last consideration is almost sufficient to 
convince me that the Payton rule authorizing entries based 
solely on arrest warrants should extend to entries in the 
homes of third parties. On balance, however, such a rule 
would impose too little restriction on the police when armed 
with an arrest warrant, and I would lean toward a search-
warrant requirment, with the police advised that they should 
err on the side of caution when uncertain whether their 
suspect "lives" at a particular location. 
!Interestingly, a similar problem is presented by the 
question of petr's status in this home. See § I, supra. 
Rakas and Salvucci require the courts to decide whether the 
person raising a Fourth Amendment claim had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the premises searched. But this 
determination can be made after-the-fact, and these cases do 
not require the police to make a determination on their own 
prior to a search. 
- 12. 
Summary and Recommendation 
There is a serious problem presented by the question 
of petr's status in the cabin. If he was not a resident of 
the cabin, he has no standing to raise the Fourth Amendment 
claim. This issue was not litigated below because "automatic 
standing" was still the law, but the SG did describe the cabin 
as petr's residence in its Brief in Opposition to the 
Petition. Now, the SG describes that as an error and seeks a 
remand or some other disposition that does not reach the --
merits. I tend to agree, since it does not appear that the SG -
waived this question. A DIG, however, would seem unfair to 
petr. 
The SG 's argument that petr should not be able to 
raise his claim on the merits because Payton does not apply 
retroactively is wrong for two reasons. First, under your 
opinion in Hankerson, all new decisions should apply to cases 
still on direct appeal. Second, petr's argument is not based ~Jy ~ - -----
directly on Payton. Instead, he is arguing for a new Fourth  
Amendment rule that was followed in some circuits well befor~
Payton. He therefore is entitled to the benefit of a decision v fY~~ 
for him on the merits. 
On the merits, petr makes a forceful argument that 
~ 
an arrest warrant for a third party does little or nothing to 
protect a resident of a house from unreasonable entries. And 
the practical difficulties associated with obtaining search 
warrants prior to such entries do not seem unbearable, since 
---...-' 
13. 
people are not all that different from objects. There is, 
however, a serious problem with requiring the police to decide 
on the spot whether their suspect is a resident or a visitor 
in a given home. If you think this last problem can be 
overcome, and that it is proper to reach the merits here, I 
would rule for petitioner. 
79-6777 STEAGALD v. U.S. Argued 1/14/81 
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CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~ltpumc Qiourl cf tqt 1fuiitb )t;lts 
J}as4i:ngtttn. ~. <.q. 211~'-1-~ 
January 26, 1981 
RE: 79-6777 - Steaga1d v. United States 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
My vote in the above is to reverse. 
Regards-
~· ... 
l __  
-
March 12, 1981 
Gary Keith Steagald v. United States 
•M, 
oeart Thurgood: 
As I voted tentatively to affirm in this case, I 
await the dissent. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
LFP/lab 
Copies to the Conference 
-, 
~uprtmt C!Jottd oft¥ 'Jlfuit.dt ~mull' 
'J)Jrattltittgton, ]). C!J. 20,5J.~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
-JUSTICE -JOHN PAUL STEVE NS 
March 12, 1981 
Re : 79-6777 - Steagald v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 




Copies to the Conference 
/ 
.®n.p-rmu <qcurlcf firt ~b ~httt.s' 
~rurfrht~ ~. <q. 20,?'!>~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .... J . BRENNAN, JR. March 16, 1981 




Justice Marsha 11 
cc: The Conference 
. ' . 
- I 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQU IST 
.;§uprtmt <!Jourl of flrt 'JE!nittb .;§"fitks 
2itasfrington. lJil. <!J. 20,?J!~ 
March 16, 1981 
Re: No. 79-6777 Stegald v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 




Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
----· 
... 
CHAM BERS OF" 
~u:prmtt <!Jcmt of tlp· ~lt ~faf.tg 
~cwlyin.ghm.lB. <!J. 21J,?Jl.~ 
,JU S TI C E POTTER STE WART 
____ .:..------~ 
... ... , 
March 16, 1981 
Re: No. 79-6777, Steagald v. United States 
Dear Thurgood, 




Justice Marsha 11 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~uprtmt (!fltttrl of tltt ~ttittb .;%~s­
';!l:ts-Iyitt:gton. ~. <!f. 2ll.;tJ!.;l 
April 2, 1981 
Re: No. 79-6777 - Steagald v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although after the argument I was troubled by this 
case, I am now convinced that your opinion reaches the 
correct result. Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
)!till 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
'' 
\ 1'.: ,• 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~tt.trrtmt <qo-urt o-f flrf ~~ ~tab.s­
~~.~.<q. 20~~~ 
April 15, 1981 
Re: 79-6777 - Steagald v. U.S. 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me in your dissenting 
opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 








To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Paul Smith 
Re: Justice Rehnquist's Dissent in No. 79-6777, Steagald v. 
United States 
I do not find this the most convincing argument 
for the dissenting point of view. Leaving aside the long 
common-law discussion, which I do not consider determinative 
in a case of this kind, the opinion is somewhat 
schizophrenic in that it initially bemoans the effect of the 
majority's position on law enforcement, then points out the 
narrow limits of the holding. I find the second set of 
arguments somewhat more persuasive. The search warrant 
argument would apply only where there are no exigent 
circumstances and the person cannot be said to "live" in the 
home. Moreover, telephonic warrants can be obtained while a 
2. 
home is under surveillance, and this should be possible in 
those cases that lack exigent circumstances. 
I continue to believe that Justice Rehnquist's 
most telling point is one he merely mentions, on p. 15 of 
the typewritten draft--the uncertainty from the point of 
view of the police concerning who resides at a particular 
residence. But on balance I would no allow this problem to 
prevent a join of the majority. Neither answer is wholly 
satisfactory, but Just ice Marshall's seems truer to basic 
Fourth Amendment principles. 
.:§u.prmu ~em-f nf tqt ~b ,:§taltil 
'J)nas frin:ght~ to. <.q. 2llgt>J,~ 
CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
April 17, 1981 
RE: 79-6777 - Steagald v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please show me judgment. 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
April 16, 1981 
79-6777 Steagald v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I continue to have some doubts, given 
Payton that I joined, I believe your opinion reflects Fourth 
Amendment principles under our cases. 
Your subpart IV-B also is persuasive on the 
question of whether the Court's holding in this case will 
present practical problems for law enforcement officers. 
Accordingly, I join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
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